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Fundamental Rights in a Post-Obergefell World
Peter Nicolast
ABSTRACT: In this Article, I identify and critically examine three substantive
criticisms raised by the dissents in the Supreme Court's 2015 decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges, which struck down state laws and constitutional
provisions barring same-sex couples from marrying within the state or having
their out-of-state marriages recognized by the state. First, that the majority
improperly framed the right at issue broadly as the right to marriage instead of
narrowly as the right to same-sex marriage, conflicting with the Court's holding
in Washington v. Glucksberg that in fundamental rights cases the right at issue
must be framed narrowly, and in turn opening the door to the Court finding an
analogous right to polygamous marriage. Second, that the right to marriage
sought in the case was a positive right, and that the Court thus erred in
recognizing the right as fundamental under the Due Process Clause, which only
protects negative rights. And finally, that the majority's invocation of the Equal
Protection Clause in tandem with the Due Process Clause in support of its
conclusion was both doctrinally without support and violated the canon against
unnecessarily deciding constitutional questions.
First, I contend that the majority's framing of the right at issue broadly as
the right to marriage was consistent with Glucksberg, demonstrating that the
precedents upon which it was built, while requiring specific framing, do not
call for the narrowest framing possible. I further demonstrate that because
Glucksberg's framing requirement is only the first step in a multi-step process
for determining a law's constitutionality, the majority's approach does not
portend the striking down of laws prohibiting plural marriage. Next, while
agreeing with the dissents that the Due Process Clause protects only negative
rights, I demonstrate that the Equal Protection Clause has historically protected
positive rights. Because marriage has historically consisted of a bundle of
rights, both positive and negative, I argue that the majority's invocation of both
clauses was not only supported by precedent but was also necessary to the
decision.
t William L. Dwyer Chair in Law and Adjunct Professor of Gender, Women & Sexuality Studies,
University of Washington.
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Finally, I consider the implications of Obergefell's invocation of both the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses on a specific hypothetical: a future
law enacted by a state legislature to withdraw from the marriage business by
eliminating state-sanctioned marriage on an even-handed basis for same-sex
and opposite-sex couples alike. I demonstrate that as a result of other doctrinal
developments in the Court's substantive due process jurisprudence, there likely
are no longer any negative rights that a state can constitutionally tie to
marriage, and thus that if the Court were confronted directly with the question,
it would conclude that the right to marry as it exists today consists solely of
positive rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause. Because fundamental
rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause can be extinguished by states so
long as they do so in an even-handed manner, this arguably means that a state
could withdraw from the marriage business. However, I contend that because
the Due Process Clause also protects a separate negative right related to
marriage-the right of existing married couples to retain their status as such-a
state could never truly eliminate marriage on an even-handed basis because it
could not retroactively strip existing married couples of their status as married.
Accordingly, despite the conditional nature of the positive fundamental right o
marry, I conclude that the right, once created by a state and exercised by some,
cannot be subsequently withdrawn.
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INTRODUCTION
In Obergefell v. Hodges,I the United States Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional state laws and constitutional provisions barring same-sex
couples from lawfully marrying within the state or having their lawful out-of-
state marriages recognized by the state. The decision followed exactly two
years to the day from the Court's decision in United States v. Windsor,2 in
which the Court struck down as unconstitutional a provision in the federal
Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") that defined marriage for purposes of
federal law as between a man and a woman and that refused to recognize
marriages validly entered into in states where same-sex marriage is lawful.
The Windsor Court declared DOMA unconstitutional without deciding the
question whether sexual orientation discrimination was a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification subject to heightened equal protection scrutiny and
without invoking the Court's fundamental right to marry cases. Instead, in a
somewhat opaque opinion, the Court cited several of its equal protection and
substantive due process decisions involving gay rights-none of which
purported to apply anything other than rational basis scrutiny-along with
federalism principles.
3
Post- Windsor, several lower federal courts declared the state law analogues
to DOMA to be unconstitutional on class-based equal protection grounds-
invoking Windsor as a basis for declaring classifications based on sexual
orientation to be suspect or quasi-suspect and thus subject to some form of
heightened scrutiny. However, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in
Obergefell eschewed deciding the case on that basis.4 Instead, the Court
concluded that such laws interfered with the fundamental right to marry5
protected primarily by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause6 but
also buttressed by its Equal Protection Clause.
7
Setting to one side the rhetorical flourishes found in portions of the
separately written dissents in the case8 that garnered a fair amount of attention
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
2. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
3. See id. at 2689-96; id. at 2696-97 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2705-07 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
4. See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 467-68 (9th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648,
659 (7th Cir. 2014). The Obergefell Court also declined to decide the case on the alternative ground that
the bans on same-sex marriage were in fact sex discrimination subject to intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Latta, 771 F.3d at 479 (Berzon, J., concurring) (so holding).
5. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
6. Id. at 2597-2602.
7. Id. at 2602-04. After Windsor but prior to Obergefell, some lower federal courts had also
invoked the fundamental right to marry as a basis for striking down such laws. See Bostic v. Schaefer,
760 F.3d 352, 375 (4th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1208 (10th Cir. 2014).
8. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616-22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (analogizing the decision to the
Court's decisions in Lochner and Dred Scott); id. at 2629, 2630 n.22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing
the decision as a "judicial Putsch" and declaring that "[t]he Supreme Court of the United States has
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in popular media coverage of the decision,9 two of the dissents nonetheless
raised several serious substantive doctrinal criticisms of the majority's decision
that are worthy of attention and consideration. First, Chief Justice Roberts
argued that the decision-by framing the right at issue as "marriage" rather
than "same-sex marriage"-was inconsistent with the Court's two-part test for
framing and recognizing fundamental rights most clearly articulated in
Washington v. Glucksberg,'0 which requires a "careful" description of the right
at issue and a showing that the right, so framed, is deeply rooted in the
country's history and tradition." In turn, the Chief Justice contended that the
majority's methodology would likewise result in a finding that there is a
fundamental right to polygamous marriage.12 Second, Justice Thomas and the
Chief Justice contended that the right being sought in the case-the right to
marry-is a positive right, and that the Court's fundamental rights
jurisprudence has clearly and uniformly protected only negative rights.'3 And
finally, the Chief Justice contended that the majority's bimodal invocation of
both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses in support of its conclusion
that there is a fundamental right to marry a person of the same sex was not only
doctrinally without support but also violated the canon against unnecessarily
deciding constitutional questions.
14
If taken together at face value, these criticisms suggest that he Obergefell
decision was groundbreaking not only for its specific holding regarding the
right of same-sex couples to marry, but also more broadly for altering the way
in which the Court will recognize fundamental rights in the future. For reasons
I have detailed elsewhere, 15 1 am critical of the Obergefell decision for its
failure to decide the case at least in part on class-based equal protection
grounds. Nonetheless, in this Article I seek to defend the Court's fundamental
rights reasoning against the charges leveled by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Thomas. In this Article, I demonstrate that Obergefell is consistent with,
rather than a break from, the Court's pre-existing general fundamental rights
jurisprudence, and I assess the decision's implications for future cases
involving marriage rights.
In Part I of this Article, I respond to the Chief Justice's criticisms of the
manner in which the Obergefell Court framed the right at issue and its
descended from the disciplined legal reasoning of John Marshall and Joseph Story to the mystical
aphorisms of the fortune cookie").
9. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Rules Gay Couples Nationwide Have a Right to Marry,
WASH. POST (June 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/gay-marriage-and-other-major-
rulings-at-the-supreme-court/2015/06/25/ef75al 20-1 b6d- I e5-bd7f-4611 a60dd8e5_story.html.
10. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
11. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2618-21 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)).
12. See id. at 2621-22.
13. See id. at 2635-37 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
14. See id. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
15. See Peter Nicolas, Obergefell's Squandered Potential, 6 CALIF. L. REv. CIR. 137 (2015).
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implications for future legal challenges to laws prohibiting plural marriage. In
Part I.A, I demonstrate that whatever the Glucksberg majority-which included
Justice Kennedy-intended by the phrase "careful description," the precedents
upon which Glucksberg was built make clear that it was not intended to require
that a right be framed in the narrowest way possible, and thus that the
Obergefell Court's framing of the right at issue as "marriage" rather than
"same-sex marriage" was fully consistent with the Glucksberg line of cases. In
Part I.B, I demonstrate that although framing the right at this level of generality
means that laws prohibiting plural marriage likewise infringe upon the
fundamental right to marry, because the Glucksberg two-step process is itself
only the first step in a larger two-step process for determining a law's
constitutionality, the Obergefell Court's decision striking down laws banning
same-sex marriage does not portend the striking down of laws prohibiting
plural marriage.
In Part 11 of this Article, I respond to the claim by the Chief Justice and
Justice Thomas that the Court in Obergefell was wrong to vindicate the right to
marry at issue therein because the right sought therein was a positive right. I
contend that although Justice Thomas and the Chief Justice are correct that the
Due Process Clause has only protected negative rights deemed fundamental,
they are incorrect both in their characterization of the right to marry as solely a
positive right, as well as in their contention that positive fundamental rights are
devoid of any constitutional protection. In Part IL.A, I demonstrate that the right
to marry has historically served as a gateway to engaging in a number of
negative liberties deemed fundamental under the Due Process Clause, including
the rights to procreate and to engage in non-procreative sexual activity.
Because at the time of the Obergefell decision, numerous states continued to
criminalize sexual activity between unmarried persons via their fornication
statutes, because such statutes have as yet not explicitly been declared
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court, and because the plaintiffs in
Obergefell did not raise challenges to the constitutionality of fornication
statutes, the right to marry at issue in Obergefell was properly treated by the
Court as a gateway to the exercise of constitutionally protected negative
liberties. In Part II.B, I demonstrate that the Court has also historically
protected or at least entertained protecting positive fundamental rights-
including the positive aspects of the right to marry-via the Equal Protection
Clause. Because I conclude that what has loosely been described as "the
fundamental right to marry" in fact has historically encompassed a bundle of
rights-both positive and negative-the components of the right to marry are
separately protected by the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
Accordingly, although the Court's reasoning is admittedly somewhat muddled
2016]
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and thus "difficult to follow,"'1 6 I conclude that the Court's invocation of both
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses was not only consistent with
precedent but was also necessary to the Court's decision.
In Part III of this Article, I consider the implications of Obergefell's
invocation of both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses on a specific
hypothetical: a future law enacted by a state legislature to withdraw from the
marriage business by eliminating state-sanctioned marriage on an even-handed
basis for same-sex and opposite-sex couples alike. In Part III.A, I note that
fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clause cannot be extinguished
even if the right is denied even-handedly to everyone, suggesting that such a
proposed state law would be deemed unconstitutional. Yet I further
demonstrate that because the Court's contemporary substantive due process
jurisprudence has decoupled marriage from the negative rights traditionally
associated with it, upon close analysis in a case in which the issue is squarely
before the Court, it likely would find the negative fundamental right o marry to
be moribund and thus not a barrier to a state's decision to withdraw from the
marriage business. In Part 1I.B, I note that my conclusion in Part III.A means
that the Equal Protection Clause would be deemed the sole protector of the
fundamental right to marry. Because the Court's precedents allow fundamental
rights protected solely by the Equal Protection Clause to be extinguished by
legislative bodies so long as they do so on an even-handed basis, I contend that
this would suggest hat states opposed to same-sex marriage possess the power
to eliminate state-sanctioned marriage as it exists today, provided that they do
so for same-sex and opposite-sex couples alike. In Part II1.C, I contend that
although in theory states possess this power, because the Due Process Clause
also protects a separate negative right related to marriage-the right of existing
married couples to retain their status as such-a state could never truly
eliminate marriage on an even-handed basis because it could not retroactively
strip existing married couples of their status as married. Accordingly, despite
the conditional nature of the positive fundamental right to marry, I conclude
that the right, once created by a state and exercised by some, cannot be
subsequently withdrawn.
I. OBERGEFELL AND THE GLUCKSBERG "Two STEP"
Conservative Supreme Court Justices have long been concerned with the
Court's potentially boundless power to identify and enforce unenumerated
fundamental rights,17 typically referred to as the doctrine of "substantive due
16. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
17. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398-99 (1798) (opinion of [redell, J.). See generally
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 755-65 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
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process."1 8 One of the more prominent-and controversial--examples of the
doctrine is the right to an abortion recognized by the Court in Roe v. Wade19
and its progeny.
Although some conservative Justices contend the power to recognize and
enforce such rights simply does not exist,20 in recent decades they have
grudgingly acknowledged the power and have instead sought o establish tests
for recognizing and enforcing such rights that are designed to cabin the Court's
future discretion in this realm. 2 The elements of these tests have contained two
key features: framing the alleged right at issue in narrower rather than broader
terms, and then inquiring whether the right, so framed, is deeply rooted in the
nation's history and traditions.22
Ultimately, in 1997, five Justices--Chief Justice Rehnquist along with
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas-coalesced around a
common test. At issue in Washington v. Glucksberg23 was whether a law
making it a crime to assist someone in committing suicide ran afoul of a
fundamental right guaranteed by the substantive component of the Due Process
24Clause. Under the test set forth therein, the Court held that identifying
fundamental rights requires a two-part inquiry: First, the court must articulate a
"careful description" of the alleged right at stake and second, it must ask
whether the right, so described, is "objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that
'neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."'25
A. A Closer Look at the "Careful Description" Requirement
Although set forth as a two-step process, in truth, the first step-how
narrowly or broadly the right is framed-will nearly always be outcome
determinative.26 If the right at issue is phrased in extremely narrow and specific
18. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Planned Parenthood of Se.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992) (plurality opinion).
19. 410 U.S. 113(1973).
20. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631-32 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Casey, 505 U.S. at 998-1002
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
21. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-21.
22. See id. at 720-21; Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-95 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003).
23. 521 U.S. 702.
24. Id. at 705-07.
25. Id. at 720-21 (internal citations omitted). The Court's opinion listed the steps in the opposite
order, see id., but in applying the test, it followed the order set forth in the text accompanying this note,
see id. at 722-28.
26. See Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 477 (9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, J., concurring); Bostic v.
Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 389-90 (4th Cir. 2014) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting); Peter Nicolas, Straddling the
Columbia: A Constitutional Law Professor's Musings on Circumventing Washington State's Criminal
Prohibition on Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1235, 1271 (2014).
2016]
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terms-such as the right to physician-assisted suicide-one is almost certain
not to find support for the right in canvassing the nation's history and
traditions. On the other hand, if it is phrased in broader terms-such as the right
to exercise autonomy over one's body--one is far more likely to find historical
support since one need not find support for the specifically articulated right but
instead the more generalized one.
As indicated above, in Glucksberg, the Court described the framing step as
calling for a "careful description" of the right at issue. Although the Court did
not define the term "careful" with precision, in applying the "careful
description" requirement it appeared to equate "careful" with precise or narrow,
holding that the right at issue was not properly framed more generally as the
"right to die" or the right to "control of one's final days," but more specifically
as "a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing
,,27 fae h or avse hso. Having so framed the right, the Court canvassed the historical record
and, having found that assisting suicide was criminalized at common law, in the
colonies, and in most of the states at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified, concluded that the right was thus not deeply rooted in history and
tradition, and, accordingly, that it was not a fundamental right protected by the
Due Process Clause.28
In litigation challenging state laws and constitutional provisions prohibiting
same-sex marriage, debate amongst jurists has centered around the question
whether-under Glucksberg-the right at issue should be framed narrowly as1 ,,29
"same-sex marriage" or more broadly as "marriage. The relative novelty of
same-sex marriage means that, if framed in the former terms it will fail the
Glucksberg test since such a specific right cannot be said to be deeply rooted in
the nation's history and tradition but if framed in the latter terms there is clear
historical support for the right. Jurists favoring the former method of framing
contended that Glucksberg's requirement of a "careful description" meant that
the alleged right must be framed in its "narrowest terms."
30
While Glucksberg makes clear that some degree of specificity is required
in framing the alleged right, it also seems clear that all five Justices in the
majority never would have signed on to an opinion that required the narrowest
or most specific framing possible, either for fundamental rights analysis
generally or the right to marry in particular. Specifically, two of the five
Justices who signed on to Glucksberg's majority opinion-Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy-clearly rejected this approach in two cases immediately
predating Glucksberg.
27. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722-24.
28. See id. at 710-16, 723, 728.
29. Compare Bostic, 760 F.3d at 375-77 (framing the right more generally as the right to marriage),
and Kitchen v. Hebert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1209 (10th Cir. 2014) (same), with Inniss v. Alderhold, 80 F.
Supp. 3d 1335, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (framing it as the right to same-sex marriage).
30. Bostic, 760 F.3d at 389-90 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
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First, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,31 the Court rejected a substantive due
process challenge to a state law that conclusively presumed a woman's husband
to be the father of any children born to her during the marriage, with only a
limited time period for either the husband or wife-but not third persons-to
32use blood tests to challenge the presumption. The challenge to the statute was
brought by a man who had an affair with a married woman and claimed to be
the genetic father to a child she bore.33 The plurality opinion penned by Justice
Scalia rejected a broad framing of the inquiry as "whether parenthood is an
interest that historically has received our attention and protection," instead
framing the right at issue more narrowly as "the power of the natural father to
assert parental rights over a child bom into a woman's existing marriage with
another man," or alternatively, "the rights of the natural father of a child
adulterously conceived.,34 Writing more generally on the issue of framing
substantive due process claims, Justice Scalia wrote in Michael H. that "[w]e
refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradition protecting, or
denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified.,
35
However, Justice Scalia's description of the appropriate method of framing
substantive due process claims was only joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. The
two other Justices in the plurality-Justices O'Connor and Kennedy-not only
refused to join this portion of the opinion, but wrote separately to express their
concern that this approach was "somewhat inconsistent" with t e Court's prior
36substantive due process decisions. With specific citations to the Court's prior
decisions in Loving v. Virginia 37 -striking down Virginia's criminal
prohibition on interracial marriage-and Turner v. Safley3 8-striking down a
Missouri law prohibiting prisoners from marrying-the two Justices wrote that
"[o]n occasion the Court has characterized relevant traditions protecting
asserted rights at levels of generality that might not be 'the most specific level'
available."
39
Three years later, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey 4°-in a decision reaffirming the right of a woman to decide whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy-these same two Justices-in their "joint
opinion" with Justice Souter-once again rejected the idea that fundamental
rights should always be framed "at the most specific level" possible.41 Citing
31. 491 U.S. 110(1989).
32. Id. at 117-18 (plurality opinion).
33. Id. at 113-16.
34. Id. at 125-27, 127 n.6 (citation omitted).
35. Id. at 127 n.6 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
37. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
38. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
39. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
40. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
41. Id. at 847 (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, J.).
2016]
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the Court's prior decision in Loving, they described this view as "inconsistent
with our law," noting that the most specific framing of the right at issue in that
case-the right to interracial marriage-was illegal in most States for much of
U.S. history but the Court nonetheless concluded that laws prohibiting it
violated the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.42
Given Justice Kennedy's caveats regarding framing in both Michael H. and
Casey, it was thus rather unsurprising that Justice Kennedy rejected an
argument that the right at issue in Obergefell should be framed narrowly as the
right to "same-sex marriage" instead of more broadly as the right to
"marriage." Citing the Court's preexisting marriage cases-Loving, Turner,
and Zablocki v. Redhai143-Justice Kennedy wrote that "Loving did not ask
about a 'right to interracial marriage'; Turner did not ask about a 'right of
inmates to marry'; and Zablocki did not ask about a 'right of fathers with
unpaid child support duties to marry.' 44 Rather, in all three cases, the Court
framed the right at issue as the right to marry and then proceeded to consider
the question whether the law satisfied the heightened scrutiny associated with
infringements on fundamental rights.45
Justice Kennedy previewed this interpretation of Glucksberg in his 2003
opinion for the Court in Lawrence v. Texas.4 6 In Lawrence, the Court overruled
its earlier decision in Bowers v. Hardwick47 and declared that laws
criminalizing sodomy violate the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause. In overruling Bowers, the Lawrence Court criticized the way in which
Bowers framed the right at issue in that case. According to Lawrence, the
Bowers Court framed the right at issue too narrowly-as the right to engage in
homosexual sodomy-and suggested instead that it should be more broadly
framed as the right to engage in sexual activity in private within the confines of
48a personal relationship. Although Lawrence never explicitly stated that a
fundamental right was at issue in the case,49 Obergefell rather clearly describes
Lawrence as falling within the Court's line of cases recognizing a fundamental
right to "intimate association.5 °
Thus, whatever the merits of Justice Scalia's approach to framing, it is safe
to say that his view on framing never became the law,51 and that the phrase
"careful description" was intended to be a compromise requiring relative
42. id.
43. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
44. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
45. Id.
46. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
47. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
48. 539 U.S. at 566-67.
49. Id. at 586, 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2589.
51. See Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Rogers, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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specificity but not laser-sharp precision. Indeed, even in Glucksberg itself, the
Court-in cataloguing the various decisions in its substantive due process line
of cases--cited Loving as standing for the proposition that there is a
fundamental right to marriage, not a fundamental right to interracial
marriage.52 Thus, both before and after Obergefell, under Glucksberg, the
framing cannot be so general that it is wholly unmoored from the right at issue,
such as a right to "liberty" or to "control what one does with one's body," but
must be more specific, such as a right to procure an abortion, or to "intimate
association," or to seek assisted suicide. Yet the framing also need not be
unduly "cramped,' 53 such as a right to engage in homosexual sodomy,54 or to
seek assisted suicide by means of poison.55 As one jurist has described the
balance struck by Glucksberg, courts must employ "sufficient specificity to
ground the right in a concrete application and sufficient generality to connect
the right to its animating principles.,56 Accordingly, the Chief Justice's
contention that Obergefell "effectively overrule[s] Glucksberg"57 is based on an
interpretation of the phrase "careful description" that is inconsistent with the
historical precedents upon which Glucksberg was founded.
B. Obergefell's Framing and Its Implications for Laws Prohibiting
Polygamous Marriage
For somewhat analogous reasons, the Chief Justice is also incorrect in
contending that the logic of the Obergefell decision necessarily extends to
polygamy, thus requiring laws banning polygamous marriage to be struck down
on the ground that they likewise interfere with the fundamental right to marry.58
In particular, the Chief Justice contends that one finds greater support for
polygamous than for same-sex marriage in "history and tradition" under
Glucksberg's second step,59 and that many of the rationales raised by the
majority for recognizing same-sex marriage apply with equal force to
polygamous marriages.
60
While the Chief Justice is perhaps correct that a claimed right to
polygamous marriage would presumptively fall within the fundamental right to
marry recognized by the majority, he is wrong to suggest that this would
necessarily or even possibly lead to the invalidation of such laws. First, the
comparative support in history and tradition between same-sex and
52. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
53. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 477 (9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
54. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-67.
55. Nicolas, supra note 26, at 1282.
56. Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 554 (Rogers, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2621 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
58. Id. at2621-22.
59. Id. at 2621.
60. Id. at 2621-22.
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polygamous marriage is irrelevant to the analysis. Because the proper level of
abstraction in framing the right at issue under Glucksberg is the general right to
marry, one need only find support in history and tradition for such a right, a
proposition that had been established by the Court long before Obergefell in
cases such as Loving, Zablocki, and Turner. Second, to demonstrate under
Glucksberg's two-step process that a prohibited practice touches upon a
fundamental right does not mean that the law is therefore to be struck down as
unconstitutional; it only means that the law must now be subjected to the
heightened61 level of scrutiny associated with infringements upon fundamental
rights.62 Thus, the Glucksberg two-step process is itself the first step in a two-
step process for determining the constitutionality of such a law:
The point of fundamental-rights analysis is to protect an individual's
liberty against unwarranted governmental encroachment. So it is a
two-step analysis: is the right fundamental, and, if so, is the
government encroachment unwarranted (that is, does the encroachment
survive strict scrutiny)? At the first step, the right to marry-to choose
one's own spouse-is just as important to an individual regardless of
whom the individual chooses to marry....
It is only at the second step--on the question of whether the
government encroachment is unwarranted-that the nature of the
restriction becomes critical. The governmental interest in overriding a
person's fundamental right to marry may be different in these different
situations ... but that is a different issue from whether the right itself
is fundamental.6 3
Consider, in this regard, the many decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court
upholding laws that in some way restrict a woman's right to procure an
abortion. In those cases, the Court did not reject the contention that the laws at
issue involved the right to an abortion protected by the substantive component
of the Due Process Clause. Rather, in those cases, the Court concluded that the
laws at issue-or portions of those laws-survived the heightened scrutiny
61. 1 use the term "heightened" rather than strict because in recent decades the Court's decisions
have been somewhat inconsistent on the level of scrutiny that applies to such laws, sometimes using
language suggesting a lower standard than strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-88 (1992) (applying "undue burden" standard to laws infringing upon the
right to procure an abortion); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (applying what appears to
be intermediate scrutiny to a law infringing upon the right to marry).
62. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1217 (10th Cir. 2014) ("Whether a state has good
reason to exclude individuals from the marital relationship based on a specific characteristic certainly
comes into play in determining if the classification survives the appropriate level of scrutiny. Even when
a fundamental right is impinged, '[s]trict scrutiny is not 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."" (internal
citations omitted)).
63. See Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1288-89 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
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applicable to infringements upon that right.64 Stated somewhat differently, the
Court did not-when considering the constitutionality of a law prohibiting
partial-birth abortion-frame the right at issue narrowly as the right to partial-
birth abortion and hold that there is no history and tradition in support of such a
specific right.65 Rather, it considered the infringement at issue to fall within the
general right to an abortion and proceeded to consider whether the law survived
66
the heightened scrutiny associated with laws infringing upon that right.
In sum, the Chief Justice may be right to suggest that Obergefell will
change things somewhat for states defending other sorts of restrictions on
marriage, such as restrictions based on age, consanguinity, and the number of
partners to the marriage.67 States will not simply be able to have such suits
dismissed on the ground that they do not infringe upon a fundamental right.
Rather, they will have to demonstrate that the restrictions are justifiable
infringements upon that right. Yet just as the Court has been able to distinguish
parental consent laws from spousal consent laws in assessing the
constitutionality of restrictions on abortion,68 and just as the lower courts have
been able to distinguish the sodomy laws struck down in Lawrence from other
sorts of laws regulating other sexual matters, such as incest
69 and prostitution,70
so too can the courts distinguish the state interests associated with prohibiting
same-sex marriage from those associated with prohibiting plural marriage,
underage marriage, and marriage between close relatives. And although one
cannot predict with certainty how future courts will decide the constitutionality
of laws prohibiting plural marriage or other types of marriage relationships that
are currently subject to widespread prohibition, such prohibitions will not fall
as a direct result of the Glucksberg analysis endorsed in Obergefell but rather
on the strength or weakness of the articulated state interests justifying those
prohibitions.
I1. NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE LIBERTY AND THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS TO
MARRY
In considering substantive due process fundamental rights claims, the
Court has distinguished between positive and negative claims, holding that the
64. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146-68 (2007) (upholding federal law prohibiting
partial-birth abortion); Casey, 505 U.S. at 879-901 (upholding state law informed consent and parental
consent provisions, recordkeeping and reporting requirements, and waiting period).
65. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 146-68.
66. See id.
67. In its 2013 decision striking down DOMA, the Court acknowledged the existence of differing
age and consanguinity restrictions nationwide. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691-92
(2013).
68. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 887-900.
69. See, e.g., Lowe v. Swanson, 663 F.3d 258, 261-65 (6th Cir. 2011).
70. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 811 N.E.2d 1197, 1199 (111. App. Ct. 2004).
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Due Process Clause only protects negative liberty, or the right to have the
government leave you alone; it does not require the government to affirmatively
act.71 Thus, for example, although women have a substantive due process right
to procure an abortion within the guideposts set forth by Roe and its progeny,
the Due Process Clause does not entitle a woman who cannot afford an
72
abortion to a government subsidy to pay for the procedure.
Relying on this canon, both the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas
contended that in seeking the right to marry, same-sex couples were trying not
to protect negative liberty, but instead were seeking to require the government
to affirmatively act by both publicly recognizing their relationships and
providing affirmative governmental benefits.73 The Chief Justice thus
distinguished the positive right to marriage being sought in Obergefell from the
negative rights vindicated by the Court in its earlier line of substantive due
process cases involving laws criminalizing the sale or use of contraceptives and
laws criminalizing private, consensual sexual activity:
Neither Lawrence nor any other precedent in the privacy line of
cases supports the right that petitioners assert here. Unlike criminal
laws banning contraceptives and sodomy, the marriage laws at issue
here involve no government intrusion. They create no crime and
impose no punishment. Same-sex couples remain free to live together,
to engage in intimate conduct, and to raise their families as they see fit.
In sum, the privacy cases provide no support for the majority's
position, because petitioners do not seek privacy. Quite the opposite,
they seek public recognition of their relationships, along with
corresponding government benefits.74
While the conclusion of the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas seemed to
logically follow from the principle that the substantive gloss on the Due
Process Clause protects only negative, not positive liberties, it would also seem
to be in clear tension with the Court's prior decisions in Loving, Zablocki, and
Turner, all of which recognized and vindicated a fundamental right to marry for
individuals denied that right-interracial couples in Loving, fathers who had
outstanding child support obligations in Zablocki, and prisoners in Turner. Yet
Justice Thomas distinguished those cases on the ground that at least some
negative liberties were involved in those cases:
71. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 126-27 (1992); Deshaney v. Winnebago
Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 194-99 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980).
72. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 317-18.
73. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2620 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2634-
37 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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Those precedents all involved absolute prohibitions on private actions
associated with marriage. Loving v. Virginia, for example, involved a
couple who was criminally prosecuted for marrying in the District of
Columbia and cohabiting in Virginia .... In a similar vein, Zablocki v.
Redhail involved a man who was prohibited, on pain of criminal
penalty, from "marry[ing] in Wisconsin or elsewhere" because of his
outstanding child-support obligations. And Turner v. Safley involved
state inmates who were prohibited from entering marriages without the
permission of the superintendent of the prison, permission that could
not be granted absent compelling reasons. In none of those cases were
individuals denied solel' governmental recognition and benefits
associated with marriage.
In contrast, according to Justice Thomas, the same-sex couples suing in the
cases before the Court remained free to cohabitate, raise children, engage in
intimate behavior, hold private religious marriage ceremonies, enter into civil
marriages in states that permit them, and hold themselves out as married.76
Justice Thomas's critique of the majority opinion is insightful but
incomplete. My interpretation of the Court's marriage cases culminating in
Obergefell eads me to the conclusion that what has been loosely described as
the fundamental right to marry in fact encompasses two distinct baskets of
rights protected by two different constitutional provisions. First, a set of
negative rights-and in particular the rights to engage in procreative as well as
non-procreative sexual intercourse free of governmental sanction or
interference-that are protected by the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause. And second, a set of positive rights-including official
governmental recognition of the relationship and the attendant public
benefits-that are protected by the Equal Protection Clause. Because both
negative and positive rights for same-sex couples were denied as a result of
state laws prohibiting them from marrying, the Obergefell Court's invocation
of both Clauses in tandem as a basis for striking down such laws was not only
consistent with precedent but necessary to the Court's decision.
A. The Penumbral Negative Right to Marry
Beginning with what might best be referred to as the negative right to
marry, a lawful marriage has for much of our nation's history served as the
exclusive legal gateway for engaging in both procreative and non-procreative
75. Id. at 2636-37 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). He also noted that the Virginia law
prohibited even religious ceremonies, raising First Amendment questions. Id. at 2637 n.6.
76. Id. at 2635.
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sexual activity.77 Thus, for example, at the time Loving was decided, the State
of Virginia had a statute that remains on the books to this day criminalizing sex
between unmarried persons (fornication),78 as well as a statute criminalizing
cohabitation between unmarried persons that was only recently repealed]9
Similarly, at the time Zablocki was decided, the State of Wisconsin had a
statute on the books criminalizing fornication. Accordingly, the negative right
to marry is not so much a stand-alone fundamental due process right but is
instead a derivative or penumbral right of the underlying substantive due
process rights to procreate and to engage in non-procreative sexual activity. In
other words, it is only because states have historically criminalized sexual
relations outside of marriage that marriage itself has been treated as a
substantive due process right. Under this theory, once the link between
marriage and procreative and non-procreative sexual activity is broken, the
negative right to marriage evaporates.
The right to marry was described by the Court as either "fundamental" or
protected by the Due Process Clause in dicta in two pre-Loving cases, Meyer v.
81 82Nebraskas l and Skinner v. Oklahoma. Yet in both of these early cases,
marriage seemed to be described not as an independent right but one
intertwined with procreation. Thus in Meyer, the right was described as the
right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children.,8 3 And in Skinner-a
case involving the power of a state to sterilize a prisoner and thus to take away
his ability to procreate-the Court wrote that "[m]arriage and procreation are
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."
84
A closer look at the Court's decisions in Loving and Zablocki suggests that
in declaring the laws therein to violate the fundamental right to marry, the
Court was concerned at least in part if not primarily with the connection
between marriage and the underlying right to procreate. The Loving decision-
which was primarily decided on class-based equal protection grounds and that
devoted only two short paragraphs to the substantive due process claim--cited
Skinner in support of the statement that marriage is "fundamental to our very
77. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 985 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J.,
dissenting).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (West 2015), invalidated by Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va.
2005).
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-345 (West 2012) (repealed 2013).
80. WIS. STAT. § 944.15 (1981). The statute was subsequently amended to criminalize only public
fornication. See 1983 Wis. Sess. Laws 37, 37-38.
81. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
82. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
83. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
84. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541. Although Skinner purported to decide the case on equal protection
grounds, the Court has subsequently characterized the decision as sounding in substantive due process.
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-51 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
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existence and survival.,85 Both the citation to Skinner-a case about
sterilization and its impact on the right to procreate-as well as the language
regarding our "existence and survival" at least implicitly connect the right to
marry to the underlying right to procreate.86 In Zablocki, the Court was far
more explicit in tying the right to marry to the right to procreate, writing that "if
appellee's right to procreate means anything at all, it must imply some right to
enter the only relationship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual
relations legally to take place,' 87 and noting that "Wisconsin punishes
fornication as a criminal offense."
88
In addition to the fundamental due process right to procreate that Loving
and Zablocki linked directly to the fundamental right to marry, just two years
prior to the decision in Loving, the Court's substantive due process
jurisprudence had also recognized an inverse fundamental right of married
couples not to procreate. In Griswold v. Connecticut,89 the Court recognized
that married couples have a fundamental right to obtain contraception,9° thus
recognizing a fundamental right of married couples to engage in non-
procreative sexual activity. Thus, under the legal landscape in place at the time
of Loving, marriage was rightly treated for substantive due process purposes as
a penumbral fundamental right because it served as the gateway to exercising
the rights to engage in procreative and non-procreative sexual activity.
Whether the negative fundamental right to marry retained any vitality by
the time the Court issued its decision in Obergefell-and thus whether Justice
Thomas was right to contend that no negative rights were at issue-turns on the
connection, if any, that state laws continued to make between marriage and the
rights to engage in procreative and non-procreative sexual activity at the time
the decision was rendered. Specifically, it requires resolution of the question
whether, at the time Obergefell was decided, any of the states-and perhaps
more importantly, any of the states refusing to recognize same-sex marriages-
continued to make marriage the sole lawful gateway to engaging in procreative
and non-procreative sexual activity?
At the time the Court issued its decision in Obergefell, ten states still had
statutes on the books criminalizing fornication9 '-three of which had been
85. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
86. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 985 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J.,
dissenting).
87. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978).
88. Id.at386n.11.
89. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
90. Id. at481-86.
91. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (2015); IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (2015); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/11-40 (West 2015); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 18 (West 2015); MINN. STAT. §609.34 (2015);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-15-60,
16-15-80 (2014); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104 (West 2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (2015).
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declared unconstitutional by state courts 92-and two additional states
criminalized cohabitation between unmarried opposite-sex couples.93 Thus,
state laws in nearly twenty percent of states continued to link marriage to the
negative liberties of couples to cohabit and engage in intimate conduct with one
another. Because the fornication laws (unlike the cohabitation laws) were
gender neutral, and because at least some of the states with such laws extant
also prohibited same-sex marriage (or would have but for pre-Obergefell
federal court decisions holding such laws unconstitutional),94 the Chief Justice
and Justice Thomas were thus wrong to suggest that no negative liberties were
at stake.
95
B. The Positive Right to Marry
As detailed by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas in their Obergefell
dissents, in addition to the negative rights to procreate and to engage in non-
procreative sexual activity historically associated with marriage, what we have
come to know as marriage also contains an ever-growing basket of positive
rights. Yet the positive nature of many of the rights associated with marriage
does not mean, as the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas contend, that they are
without constitutional protection. Because the positive aspects of the right to
marry have separately been established as a fundamental right under the Equal
Protection Clause, the Court was on solid ground when it opted to invoke the
latter in tandem with the Due Process Clause in declaring that the laws at issue
in Obergefell interfere with the fundamental right to marry.
The Court itself has not always been careful about distinguishing those
substantive rights protected by the Due Process Clause and those protected by
the Equal Protection Clause. The Court's mid-twentieth century fundamental
rights cases-such as Skinner and Griswold-consciously avoided reference to
the Due Process Clause to distance themselves from the so-called Lochner-era,
in which the Due Process Clause had been invoked in a series of controversial
92. See In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441, 443-44 (Ga. 2003); Hobbs v. Smith, No. 05-CVS-267, 2006
WL 3103008, at *1 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2006); Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 (Va. 2005).
93. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.02 (West 2015); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.335 (West 2015).
94. Same-sex marriages did not commence in Mississippi until after Obergefell was decided and
implemented by the lower federal courts. See Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, 791 F.3d 625 (5th Cir.
2015). Same-sex marriages in Idaho, South Carolina, and Utah were permitted only as a result of pre-
Obergefell federal court orders, see Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755
F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014); Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572 (D.S.C. 2014), and those three states
would almost certainly have sought to reinstate the bans had Obergefell come out the other way.
95. Such negative liberties were at stake even in states that prohibited same-sex marriage but that
lacked fornication laws. To the extent that citizens of those states travelled to states that both recognized
out-of-state same-sex marriages and that had fornication laws on the books-such as Illinois,
Massachusetts, and Minnesota-their home states' refusal to let them marry impacted their ability to
exercise those rights in the states in which they travelled, and thus their challenge to their home state's
ban on same-sex marriage might appropriately be considered to implicate the Due Process Clause since
it interfered with their ability to exercise those negative rights.
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economic substantive due process cases that had only recently been repudiated
by the Court.96 Thus, for example, the majority opinion in Skinner found a
fundamental right to procreate in the Equal Protection Clause,97 while the
majority opinion in Griswold found a right to marital privacy in the
"penumbras" of the Bill of Rights.98 By the time the Court issued its 1973
decision in Roe, however, these early decisions were re-characterized as being
grounded in the Due Process Clause.99 Yet, despite this general re-
characterization, three lines of fundamental rights cases have continued to rely
in whole or part upon the Equal Protection Clause post-Roe: those addressing
the claimed fundamental rights to vote, to a base level of education, and to
marry.00 In these three lines of cases, the Court has applied or considered
applying heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause not because of
the nature of the classification drawn-in none of these cases could it be said
that a suspect or quasi-suspect classification was involved-but rather because
of the fundamental nature of the right impacted.
First, the Court recognized and aggressively enforced a fundamental fight
to vote-or more specifically, a "right to participate in elections on an equal
basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction"' 0 1-protected by the Equal
Protection Clause in the mid-1960s to early 1970s,102 during the same period of
time in which it was recognizing the fundamental rights to marital privacy,
marriage, and abortion under the Due Process Clause. As recently as 2000 in
Bush v. Gore,'0 3 long after the Court had re-characterized virtually all other
fundamental rights as grounded in the Due Process Clause, the Court
nonetheless reconfirmed that the fundamental right to participate equally in the
electoral process is guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause.l4
Second, although the Court has never recognized a fundamental right to
education, to the extent that it has entertained the possibility that such a
96. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55
UCLA L. REv. 99, 112, 123 (2007); G. Edward White, The Anti-Judge: William 0. Douglas and the
Ambiguities of Individuality, 74 VA. L. REV. 17, 65-72 (1988).
97. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex. rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942).
98. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-86 (1965).
99. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-65, 573-74 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-51 (1992) (opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, JJ.); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
100. The Court at one point recognized a fundamental right to travel protected by the Equal
Protection Clause, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969), but subsequently identified the
right to travel as instead being grounded in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV as well as
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,
500-03 (1999).
101. San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 34 n.74 (1973) (quoting Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972)).
102. See Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336; Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28
(1969); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566
(1964).
103. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
104. ld. at 104-05.
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fundamental right exists, it has relied on the Equal Protection Clause to do so.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez'0 5 the Court
considered the constitutionality of a state system in which public schools are
funded differentially based on local property tax levies, resulting in unequal
levels of spending on public education by district.' 06 In considering whether
this resulted in a deprivation of a fundamental right to an education in those
districts with lower levels of funding, the Court invoked not the Due Process
Clause but instead the Equal Protection Clause.0 7 Although the Court rejected
the claim under the circumstances of the case, it left open the possibility that
the Equal Protection Clause does protect a fundamental right to a base level of
education.10 8
Finally, in the Court's postLoving cases regarding the fundamental right to
marry, it has either explicitly or implicitly invoked the Equal Protection Clause
in tandem with the Due Process Clause as a basis for the right. First, in
Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court-after noting and citing with approval the
Loving Court's invocation of the Due Process Clause as well as numerous
substantive due process precedents-proceeded to invoke the Equal Protection
Clause as a basis for striking down the statute at issue therein,1°9 which denied
the right to marry to those in arrears of making child support payments.'10
Next, in Turner v. Safley, the Court-in striking down a Missouri law barring
inmates from marrying-did not specify whether it was relying on the Due
Process or Equal Protection Clause or both, instead simply citing Loving and
Zablocki in support of the conclusion that there is a fundamental right to
marry."' And finally, as detailed above, the Court in Obergefell invoked both
Clauses as a basis for striking down state laws prohibiting same-sex
marriage. 112
What ties these three lines of cases together that would justify invocation
of the Equal Protection Clause in lieu of the Due Process Clause as a basis for
vindicating the fundamental rights invoked therein? One way to distinguish
these lines of cases-as some commentators have-is that these lines of cases
all involved a targeted rather than a widespread denial of a fundamental
right.113 In other words, while Griswold and Roe involved a blanket denial of
the rights to contraception and abortion for everyone, the voting, education, and
105. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
106. Id. at 4-17.
107. Id. at 29-44.
108. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 284-85 (1986); Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37.
109. 434 U.S. 374, 381-87 (1978).
110. Id. at 377-78.
111. 482 U.S. 78, 94-95 (1987).
112. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597-604 (2015).
113. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 10.1.1, at
812-14 (4th ed. 2011); Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There's No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27, 33-
34(1996).
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marriage cases involved a targeted denial of the right at issue to only selected
categories of persons.' 
1 4
But another characteristic that ties these three lines of cases together is that
they all involve positive rights. The voting cases seek an affirmative right to
vote in elections, the education cases seek the right to government-funded
education, and the marriage cases seek affirmative government
acknowledgment of the relationship coupled with certain governmental
benefits. Because the Court's substantive due process line of precedent protects
only negative rights, location of these lines of cases in a different constitutional
provision was and is necessary if the Court was to have a principled way of
enforcing positive unenumerated rights in some instances but not others.
Because there are so few examples of Supreme Court cases considering
fundamental rights claims derived from the Equal Protection Clause, the
criteria for a right being so denominated is somewhat opaque. In contrast to the
structured Glucksberg two-step analysis for recognizing and enforcing
fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause that has developed over time,
the process under the Equal Protection Clause appears to be far more ipse dixit,
although the Court has made clear that mere relative "importance" of a right
does not suffice to denominate it fundamental for equal protection purposes. 15
Nonetheless, one can discern a unifying principle from the handful of cases
recognizing fundamental rights under the Equal Protection Clause.
Collectively, those cases appear to stand for the proposition that when a
government-created right serves as a precursor to a sufficiently large array of
rights, then denial of the government-created "gateway" right is tantamount to
denying a class of persons what is in effect a cornerstone of modem citizenship,
effectively relegating them to a second-class tatus. Under those circumstances,
the "gateway" right will be denominated a fundamental one under the Equal
Protection Clause. Thus, for example, the Court has treated voting as a
fundamental right on the theory that it is necessary to preserve all other civil
and political rights, reasoning that those denied the franchise for a given office
likewise lack the ability to influence the political process that in turn effects the
entire panoply of civil and political rights within a polity." 1 6 In this sense, the
government-created right to vote serves as a gateway to the exercise of a broad
range of other rights.
The positive right to marry, like the right to vote, also serves as a gateway
to the exercise of a large number of other important rights. Indeed, in both
Windsor and Obergefell, the Court took note of the sheer breadth of positive
114. Cain, supra note 113, at 32-37.
115. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
116. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 233 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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rights that marriage serves as a legal gateway for accessing.117 Moreover, the
Court explained that it was the decision of the states themselves to associate so
many rights with marriage that helped define its nature as a fundamental right,
declaring that "[t]he States have contributed to the fundamental character of the
marriage right by placing that institution at the center of so many facets of the
legal and social order."1 8 And in both cases, the Court noted that the effect of
the law was to place same-sex couples in a second-class status relative to other
couples in society.1 9 Thus, like voting, the Court in Obergefell described
marriage as a cornerstone of citizenship, referring to it as "a keystone of our
social order" and "a building block of our national community."
'1 20
This helps to explain the Court's mixed invocation of both the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses in its marriage line of cases. As indicated above,
marriage as it has come to be known contains a mix of both negative and
positive rights, making invocation of both clauses necessary to fully protect the
basket of rights marriage has come to encompass. Indeed, by the time the Court
decided Turner, the Court's emphasis had shifted to the positive rights
associated with marriage, such as government benefits and property rights.121
This was perhaps necessary due to the specific facts of the case before it. First,
unlike Virginia and Wisconsin in Loving and Zablocki, respectively, Missouri
had no fornication laws on the books and thus did not make marriage the sole
gateway to engaging in procreative and non-procreative sexual activity.
Second, because the case involved the rights of incarcerated prisoners, it was
not clear that they would ever be able to exercise the negative rights associated
with marriage due to their incarceration.
In sum, what has been described loosely in both case law and the literature
as the "fundamental right to marry" consists of a bundle of rights, both positive
and negative, that are separately protected by the Equal Protection and Due
Process clauses. Thus, the Obergefell Court's invocation of both Clauses in
tandem as a basis for striking down laws prohibiting same-sex marriage was
not only consistent with precedent but necessary to the Court's decision.
117. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601; United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2690, 2694-95
(2013).
118. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
119. Id. at 2602 (noting that "exclusion from that status has the effect of teaching that gays and
lesbians are unequal in important respects"); Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694 (describing DOMA as
"plac[ing] same-sex couples in an unstable position of being in a second-tier marriage").
120. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601.
121. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987).
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111. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE OBERGEFELL LINE OF CASES ON THE FUTURE OF
MARRIAGE
In the wake of the Obergefell decision, some legislators hostile to same-sex
marriage have proposed having their states withdraw altogether from the
marriage business by eliminating state-sanctioned marriage on an even-handed
basis for same-sex and opposite-sex couples alike.' 22 In this Part, I consider the
consequences of the Obergefell Court's invocation of both the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses on the vitality of such a proposed withdrawal from
the marriage business.
In Part IlIl.A, I note that fundamental rights protected by the Due Process
Clause cannot be extinguished even if the right is denied even-handedly to
everyone, suggesting that such a proposed law would be deemed
unconstitutional. Yet I further demonstrate that because the Court's
contemporary substantive due process jurisprudence has decoupled marriage
from the negative rights traditionally associated with it, upon close analysis in a
case in which the issue is squarely before the Court, it likely would find the
negative fundamental right to marry moribund and thus not a barrier to a state's
decision to withdraw from the marriage business. In Part IlI.B, I note that my
conclusion in Part III.A means that the Equal Protection Clause would be
deemed the sole protector of the fundamental right to marry. I contend that
because the Court's precedents allow fundamental rights protected solely by the
Equal Protection Clause to be extinguished by legislative bodies so long as they
do so on an even-handed basis, this would suggest that states opposed to same-
sex marriage possess the power to eliminate state-sanctioned marriage as it
exists today, provided that they do so for same-sex and opposite-sex couples
alike. In Part IIl.C, I contend that although in theory states possess this power,
because the Due Process Clause protects a separate negative right related to
marriage-the right of existing married couples to retain their status as such-a
state could never truly eliminate marriage on an even-handed basis because it
could not retroactively strip existing married couples of their status as married.
Accordingly, despite the conditional nature of the positive fundamental right to
marry, I conclude that the right, once created by a state and exercised by some,
cannot be subsequently withdrawn.
A. The Death of the Penumbral Negative Right to Marry
In Part II.A of this Article, I demonstrated that the Chief Justice and Justice
Thomas were wrong to assert that no negative liberties were at stake in
122. See, e.g., Robert Gehrke, Utah Lawmaker: Does Logic Behind Gay-Marriage Ruling Open
Door to 'Polygamy, Bestiality'?, SALT LAKE TRIB. (June 26, 2015),
http://www.sltrib.com/home/2670372-155/in-aftermath-of-same-sex-ruling-some.
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Obergefell, noting the many states that continued to make marriage the sole
lawful gateway to engaging in procreative and non-procreative sexual activity
by way of statutes criminalizing fornication and cohabitation between
unmarried persons. 1 thus defended the Court's invocation of the negative right
to marry protected by the Due Process Clause, noting the Court's focus on the
negative right to marry-and in particular the fact that state laws criminalizing
fornication made marriage the only lawful gateway to engaging in sexual
activity-in its pre-Obergefell marriage cases, including Loving and Zablocki.
Moreover, if indeed the right to marry is a negative right protected by the
Due Process Clause, legislators cannot extinguish the right even if they do so
on an even-handed basis that denies the right to everyone equally across the
board. If a right is deemed fundamental under the Due Process Clause,
infringements upon that right are subject to heightened scrutiny even if the
government is evenhanded and infringes upon everyone's ability to exercise
that right, as was the case in Roe where the right to an abortion was denied to
everyone across the board. Accordingly, under the Due Process Clause, the
government cannot escape constitutional scrutiny by evenhandedly denying the
right to everyone.123
Yet in another sense, the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas were absolutely
correct to state that no negative liberties were at stake in Obergefell. In this
regard, they are grudgingly accepting an eventual constitutional reality: that the
Court's substantive due process cases culminating in the Court's 2003 decision
in Lawrence have effectively recognized a fundamental right of couples-
married or unmarried, same-sex or opposite-sex-to engage in both procreative
and non-procreative sexual conduct free of governmental intrusion. 124 This line
of decisions would thus result in the invalidation of fornication and
cohabitation laws criminalizing such intimate conduct. Because invalidation of
such laws would fully break the link between the penumbral negative right to
marriage and the core fundamental rights to engage in procreative and non-
procreative sexual activity, the former would cease to exist.
To be sure, Lawrence itself involved the constitutionality of sodomy laws,
but the Court's language was broad enough to encompass fornication laws as
well. The language perhaps most on point was the Court's approving citation to
Justice Stevens's dissent in Bowers, in which he wrote, "[I]ndividual decisions
by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship,
even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this
123. See Nicolas, supra note 26, at 1268 n.166; Cain, supra note 113, at 32-33.
124. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-67, 578 (2003).
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protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married
persons."
125
In Lawrence, Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissent, which directly
stated that Lawrence undermined the constitutional rationale for fornication
laws as well.1 26 And while the Court itself has not directly addressed a
constitutional challenge to fornication laws, lower courts have invalidated such
laws both pre- and post-Lawrence.127 To the extent that cohabitation laws are
designed to prevent intimate conduct between unmarried persons,' 8 those
would likewise fall within the zone of liberty protected by Lawrence.
I thus agree with the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas that the petitioners
in the case were free in the absence of a legal marriage to live together and to
engage in intimate conduct.129 In so contending, they were accurately
portraying the way in which Lawrence confirmed a fundamental right of
unmarried persons to engage in procreative and non-procreative sexual activity.
The penumbral negative right to marry thus died a quiet death in 2003 when
Lawrence eliminated the power of states to make marriage the gateway for
engaging in sexual activity.'
30
Yet to contend as I do that the penumbral negative right to marry was
effectively extinguished in 2003 when Lawrence was decided is not to say that
the Obergefell Court erred in invoking the Due Process Clause as a partial basis
for striking down state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage. Given the
procedural posture of the cases before the Court, coupled with the fact that the
Court has not expressly held that fornication laws, like sodomy laws, violate the
Due Process Clause, the Court really had little choice but to invoke the Clause.
The plaintiffs in Obergefell and in the other cases winding their way
through the courts at the same time sued for the ability to exercise the basket of
negative and positive rights associated with marriage. In suing, the couples had
three different ways in which they could frame that challenge. The first
125. See id. at 578 (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
126. See id. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
127. See In re J.M., 575 S.E.2d 441 (Ga. 2003); Hobbs v. Smith, No. 05 CVS 267, 2006 WL
3103008, at * 1 (N.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2006); Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367, 371 (Va. 2005).
128. See Melanie C. Falco, The Road Not Taken: Using the Eighth Amendment o Strike Down
Criminal Punishment for Engaging in Consensual Sexual Acts, 82 N.C. L. REV. 723, 738 n. 122 (2004).
129. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2620 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2635 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
130. See, e.g., Mary Ann Case, Of "This" and "That" in Lawrence v. Texas, 2003 SUP. CT. REV.
75, 139 ("After Lawrence, every constitutionally recognized aspect of liberty legal marriage formerly
monopolized (sex, reproduction, parenting, etc.) seems, as a matter of constitutional right, no longer
within the state's or marriage's monopoly control. To the extent that the so-called fundamental right to
marry is, as is customary for fundamental rights under the U.S. Constitution, a negative liberty which
establishes only a limit on state interference, Lawrence, at least as an analytical matter, may spell less
the beginning than the end for same-sex couples of any claimed right of access to state-sponsored
marriage rooted in substantive due process ... ").
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approach-which the couples in all of these cases opted for'3 1 and as reflected
in the grant of certiorari 32-was to accept the power of states to make marriage
a precondition for the exercise of this basket of rights, and to challenge the
exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage. The second
approach would have been to contend that the states lacked the power to make
marriage a precondition for the exercise of some or all of the rights associated
with marriage-and in particular the rights to engage in procreative and non-
procreative sexual activity outside of marriage-and to challenge the
constitutionality of the underlying fornication laws that made marriage the sole
lawful means of engaging in such sexual activity. The third approach would
have been to invoke the first two approaches as alternative theories for why
they should be granted the relief sought in the cases.' 
33
Had the plaintiffs in Obergefell or in any of the other same-sex marriage
cases winding their way toward the U.S. Supreme Court elected the second or
third approaches, the Court would have had squarely before it the question
whether making marriage a precondition to engaging in procreative and non-
procreative sexual activity via fornication laws interfered with the right
recognized in the line of Due Process cases culminating in Lawrence. The
Court could at that point have confirmed what the Chief Justice and Justice
Thomas effectively conceded in Obergefell, namely that fornication laws are
sufficiently analogous to the sodomy laws at issue in Lawrence to be declared
unconstitutional. From that point forward-and in the absence of states linking
marriage to the exercise of any other negative rights-the Court could properly
declare the penumbral negative right to marry moribund and no longer invoke it
in cases challenging restrictions on the right to marry. But because the
constitutionality of making marriage the sole lawful gateway for exercising the
right to engage in sexual activity was not directly before the Court in
131. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396-99 (6th Cit. 2014); Condon v. Haley, 21 F.
Supp. 3d 572, 576 (D.S.C. 2014).
132. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039,1040 (2015) (granting certiorari).
133. Perhaps in part because the four states whose laws were directly at issue in Obergefell itself-
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee-did not have fornication laws on the books, it made sense
for the plaintiffs to frame the case in the way that they did. This is not to say, however, that the negative
rights to engage in procreative and non-procreative sexual activity were not at issue for these plaintiffs.
To the extent that they travelled to states that both recognized out-of-state same-sex marriages and that
had fornication laws on the books-such as Illinois, Massachusetts, and Minnesota-their home states'
refusal to let them marry impacted their ability to exercise those rights in the states in which they
travelled, and thus their challenge to their home state's ban on same-sex marriage might appropriately be
considered to implicate the Due Process Clause since it interfered with their ability to exercise those
negative rights. Alternatively, of course, they could have followed the second approach and brought suit
against the states to which they travelled or sought to travel, challenging those states' fornication laws
directly, but they did not pursue that option. In any event, the parties did not bring the presence or
absence of fornication laws to the attention of the courts in Obergefell, and so neither the lower courts
nor the Supreme Court focused on this detail in their opinions.
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Obergefell, the Court lacked an opportunity to break the link between the two
and in turn to declare the negative right to marry extinct. 1
34
If a state were to decide to eliminate marriage for same-sex and opposite-
sex couples alike, the manner in which the state opted to do so and the way in
which the parties litigated the case could bring the continued vitality of the
negative right to marry squarely before the Court. If, for example, a state
repealed both its marriage laws and its fornication statutes (or had previously
repealed its fornication statutes), and the state were sued by couples aggrieved
by the law, the state could defend the case on the ground that the negative
rights to engage in sexual activity were no longer linked to marriage and thus
that the Due Process Clause had no role to play.'35 The parties might further
litigate the question whether the presence of fornication laws in other states
meant that the marriage laws still effectively served as a gateway to the
nationwide exercise of the negative rights to engage in procreative and non-
procreative sexual activity' 36 and thus whether the negative right to marry
protected by the Due Process Clause retained vitality. The state might continue
to defend its actions on the ground that such sister state fornication laws were
of no consequence because those laws could not constitutionally be enforced
post-Lawrence.137 At that point, the Court could address the constitutionality of
the sister state fornication laws, and if it found them to be unconstitutional-
and in the absence of the state linking marriage to the exercise of any other
negative rights-the Court could properly declare the penumbral negative right
to marry moribund.138 Alternatively-although it would be quite unusual-a
state might repeal its marriage laws yet at the same time retain its fornication
laws. Aggrieved couples could sue alternatively on the grounds that repealing
134. Parties have autonomy in how they frame the constitutional claims they choose to bring, and
the Court respects that framing. Thus, for example, in the pre-Loving era, interracial couples who could
not legally marry were also subject to prosecution under state laws criminalizing interracial cohabitation
between married persons. The Court made clear that the parties could challenge the marriage laws
themselves-on the ground that but for the ban on interracial marriage they would not be subject to the
cohabitation prosecution-or they could instead challenge the cohabitation statute directly without
raising questions about the marriage ban's constitutionality. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
195-96 (1964); Peter Nicolas, Gay Rights, Equal Protection, and the Classification-Framing Quandary,
21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 329, 370-71 (2014).
135. To be sure, the defendant-states in Obergefell might have opted to defend their bans on same-
sex marriage on the ground that they had no fornication laws on the books, but none of them opted to do
so.
136. See supra note 133.
137. Alternatively, the state could make the argument that its law should be assessed solely based
on the rights it links to marriage, and that to the extent other states link other rights to out-of-state
marriages, the other states' laws should be the focus of the legal challenge.
138. See, e.g., Case, supra note 130, at 139 ("After Lawrence, every constitutionally recognized
aspect of liberty legal marriage formerly monopolized (sex, reproduction, parenting, etc.) seems, as a
matter of constitutional right, no longer within the state's or marriage's monopoly control. To the extent
that the so-called fundamental right to marry is, as is customary for fundamental rights under the U.S.
Constitution, a negative liberty which establishes only a limit on state interference, Lawrence, at least as
an analytical matter, may spell less the beginning than the end for same-sex couples of any claimed right
of access to state-sponsored marriage rooted in substantive due process .... ).
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the ability to marry violated the negative Due Process right to marry, as well as
on the ground that the fornication laws to which they would thus be subject
directly violate the fundamental right to engage in procreative and non-
procreative sexual activity. The Court could resolve the second issue in favor of
the couples, and having so concluded, might in turn reject their first claim on
the ground that in light of the ruling on the second issue, the negative Due
Process right to marry is thus obsolete.
B. The Conditional Nature of the Positive Right to Marry
As demonstrated above, in a post-Lawrence world, states no longer have
the authority to make lawful marriage a prerequisite for exercising the negative
rights to engage in procreative and non-procreative sexual activity. To the
extent that the states' linkage of marriage with the exercise of these rights was
the basis for recognizing marriage as a fundamental right under the Due
Process Clause, the negative right to marry is now-in mathematics lingo-a
null or empty set. Thus, the right to marry as it may constitutionally be defined
today includes only positive rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause.
Yet there is an important distinction between the positive fundamental
rights recognized pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause and the negative
fundamental rights recognized pursuant to the Due Process Clause: the
conditional nature of the former. In contrast to the enduring protection afforded
fundamental rights protected by the Due Process Clause, fundamental rights
protected by the Equal Protection Clause can be infringed upon or even
eliminated by the government without raising any constitutional concerns, so
long as the government does so evenhandedly and denies the right to everyone.
Only if it infringes upon or denies the right to some individuals but not others is
government's conduct subject to heightened scrutiny.1
39
The conditional nature of positive fundamental rights protected by the
Equal Protection Clause is most clearly seen in the Court's right to vote line of
cases. In that line of cases, the Court made clear that there is no freestanding
fundamental right to vote for any particular governmental position, such as a
presidential elector, school board member, or state judges. Thus, a state does
not run afoul of the fundamental right to vote guaranteed by the Equal
Protection Clause if it simply does away with everyone's right to vote for a
particular official, say, by eliminating popular elections for state court judges
and instead having the governor appoint them, or by eliminating popular
elections for Presidential electors and having the legislature directly appoint
139. See Cain, supra note 113, at 30-37; Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution:
A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process andEqual Protection, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 1161, 1168-
69 (1988); Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 1375, 1412-20 (2010).
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such persons.40 However, once the state chooses to extend the right to vote for
a given office, it must do so in an even-handed manner. If it fails to extend the
right to vote equally to everyone, the denial of that right to certain classes of
persons is subject to heightened scrutiny. 141
Given this distinction between rights protected by the Due Process Clause
and those protected by the Equal Protection Clause, if my conclusion in Part
II1.A is correct that the negative rights associated with marriage evaporated
when Lawrence was decided, this would suggest that states could opt to
eliminate civil marriage, provided that they did so in an even-handed manner
and did not solely target same-sex couples. Indeed, several commentators have
read the Court's decisions as protecting the fundamental right to marry solely
via the Equal Protection Clause and have thus concluded that-as with the right
to equal participation in the electoral process-states can eliminate the right to
marry without running afoul of the Constitution by simply eliminating it on an
even-handed basis for everyone and getting out of the marriage business.42 If
true, this would seem to lend support to the constitutionality of post-Obergefell
proposals by some state legislators to avoid having to permit same-sex couples
to marry by withdrawing altogether from the business of marriage.
C. The Negative Right to Retain One's Marriage
Although the evaporation of the negative right to marry post-Lawrence,
coupled with the conditional nature of positive rights protected solely by the
Equal Protection Clause as demonstrated by the fundamental right to vote
cases, would seem to lend support to the conclusion that state legislatures can
withdraw from the marriage business, I believe that the answer is somewhat
more complicated. While I agree that, in theory, my conclusions regarding the
evaporation of the negative right to marry gives states this power, there are
important differences between the fleeting nature of the right to vote on the one
hand and the enduring nature of the right to marry on the other that in practice
would make it constitutionally impossible for a state to withdraw from the
marriage business once having entered into it.
Consider, for example, a state that has historically provided for direct
election of its state supreme court justices but wishes, starting in 2016, to have
justices appointed by the governor and confirmed by the state legislature.
Because the nature of exercising the right to vote is such that it is exercised
briefly and repeatedly over time, it is very easy for a state to withdraw the right
140. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000).
141. See id. at 104-05; Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626-30 (1969);
Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665-66 (1966).
142. See Cain, supra note 113, at 30-43; Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2081, 2089-98 (2005).
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to vote from everyone on an even-handed basis. Prior to the conversion date, all
qualified voters were able to exercise the right to vote for justices in any given
election, and after the conversion date, no qualified voters are able to exercise
that right. There are no individuals in the state who retain any vestigial power
to directly elect justices.
Marriage, however, is a much more enduring relationship. Unlike voting, it
is a relationship that is entered into and-absent judicial dissolution--defines a
couple's status throughout their joint lives. Were a state to suddenly cease the
issuance of marriage licenses to new couples seeking to get married, there still
would be countless couples who married prior to the date the state withdrew
from the marriage business. Only if the state sought by legislative action to
retroactively dissolve the marriages of those who had previously married could
the legislature's actions be described as even handed in the sense that the
fundamental rights prong of the Equal Protection Clause would seem to
contemplate.
Yet any effort by a state to dissolve the marriages of those who had
previously married under valid state marriage laws would run into
constitutional problems of its own. While there are no historical examples of
states withdrawing from the marriage business altogether, states have in the
past enacted legislation prohibiting types of marriages that had previously been
permitted, including same-sex marriage, interracial marriage, common law
marriage, and marriage between persons of close consanguinity. In litigation
regarding the scope of such laws, courts have unanimously treated the changes
in the laws as prospective only, typically concluding that pre-existing marriages
were a sort of vested property right the abrogation of which would violate the
substantive due process rights of the effected couples.1 43 In other words, even if
there is no substantive due process right to get married in the first instance,
there is a separate substantive due process right to retain the status and
attendant property interests once lawfully attained.
144
In this sense, the positive fundamental right to marry recognized under the
Equal Protection Clause acts as a sort of dormant one-way right. States have the
power never to extend the right to its citizens in the first instance, but once they
extend the right, they cannot subsequently withdraw it. Thus, if an imaginary
fifty-first state sprung into existence that never had an established scheme of
civil marriage, they would be under no constitutional compulsion to extend
such a right to their citizens upon entering the union. However, the other fifty
143. See Caspar v. Snyder, 77 F. Supp. 3d 616, 624-29 (E.D. Mich. 2015); Evans v. Utah, 21 F.
Supp. 3d 1192, 1203-10 (D. Utah 2014); Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 121-22 (Cal. 2009); Cook v.
Cook, 104 P.3d 857, 864-67 & n.7 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); Mark Strasser, Constitutional Limitations and
Baehr Possibilities: On Retroactive Legislation, Reasonable Expectations, and Manifest Injustice, 29
RUTGERS L.J. 271, 307-10 (1998).
144. See Caspar, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 625.
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states, having already created such schemes, are constitutionally powerless to
eliminate them. 
145
In this sense, despite my conclusion that the negative fundamental right to
marry disappeared when the Court decided Lawrence, it is accurate to say that
the right to marry remains protected today by the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses working in tandem, but for a somewhat different reason than
the theory implicitly and properly endorsed by Justice Kennedy in Obergefell.
Under the theory that I have set forth above, the Due Process Clause protects
the right of existing married couples to retain their marriages, while the Equal
Protection Clause guarantees existing unmarried couples the right to enter such
marriages on an equal basis with those who have previously had the
opportunity to exercise that right.
CONCLUSION
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court broke important ground for same-sex
couples for its specific holding regarding the right of same-sex couples to
marry. Yet despite the important criticisms raised by the dissents, the
Obergefell Court did not substantially alter its fundamental rights
jurisprudence. After Obergefell just as before, fundamental rights recognized
under the Due Process Clause are framed in specific but not unduly narrow
terms. After Obergefell just as before, a finding that a law infringes upon a
fundamental right does not result in invalidation of the law, but only requires
that the law be closely scrutinized. And after Obergefell just as before, the
fundamental right to marry is dually protected by the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses working in tandem. Moreover, by clearly placing the
Court's gay rights cases squarely within the Court's fundamental rights lines of
cases, Obergefell brought much needed clarity that will aid lower courts
considering future fundamental rights claims.
145. For the purposes of this hypothetical, I am assuming that the state seeks to get out of the
business of legally recognizing relationships altogether, as opposed to instead redenominating such
relationships something else for everyone, such as civil unions or domestic partnerships, while
maintaining all of the rights associated with it. It is doubtful that the Due Process Clause protects a right
to retain the name marriage as opposed to the underlying fights associated with it. See In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 384,434-35 (Cal. 2008).
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